Marco Czygan
"Wettbewerb im Hörfunk in Deutschland. Eine industrieökonomische Analyse"
('Competition in radio broadcasting in Germany. An industrial economic analysis')

published in:
Schriften zur Medienwirtschaft und zum Medienmanagement, Volume 2
Baden-Baden, Nomos-Verlag, 2003
ISBN 3-8329-0194-9

Abstract (German)

In public and scientific discussions radio broadcasting stands mostly in television broadcasting's shadow, despite being as widely used and even more regulated. This justifies a detailed analysis.

The work is based on the industrial economic structure-conduct-performance paradigm. It begins with the identification of the markets the radio broadcasters act on. They work in two kinds of sales markets, the listener markets and the advertising markets, as well as distribution and input markets. For each of these markets, detailed market distinctions are performed that build the basis for the following work.

The next chapter examines if the economic arguments for a sector-specific regulation can be applied to radio broadcasting. The analysis shows that market failures exist only in parts of the radio broadcasting system.

In the following chapter, the German radio broadcasting markets are analyzed. The description of the institutional framework shows high public market barriers for private broadcasters. The market analysis shows the dominance of public broadcasters and the resulting inefficiencies.

The United States’ radio broadcasting system is presented as an example of a liberal broadcasting model. Several characteristics of the German and American systems are compared and many advantages of the American system are demonstrated.

On one hand, the economic results show that a sector-specific regulation is only necessary in small parts of the radio broadcasting system. On the other hand, heavy regulation can be observed in Germany. This leads to recommendations that are outlined in the last chapter. These recommendations aim at a deregulated competitive radio broadcasting system in Germany without a large public influence. They encompass an explicit task description of public radio broadcasters which would result in a limitation of their programs to those that supplement private programs. The result of enforced competition between a greater number of private radio broadcasters will lead to huge efficiency gains and a wider choice for the consumers.

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